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	MJIR	25X1
TO	SAIGON EYES ONLY CITE HEADQUARTERS	
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	1. RE PARA THREE OF REF. WE HAVE SUMMARIZED OUR	
	2 APRIL MEMORANDUM ASSESSING SELECTED PACIFIC AREA COUNTRY	
25X1	REACTIONS TO SINCE THIS MEMORANDUM WAS RE-	
	QUESTED DIRECTLY BY THE WHITE HOUSE AND SENT ONLY XXXX	
	THERE, WITH NO REPEAT NO OTHER DISSEMINATION, IT IS CLEARLY	
	REGARDED BY ITS REQUESTOR/RECIPIENT AS A SENSITIVE DOCUMENT.	
	THE SUMMARY BELOW IS THEREFORE BEING RELAYED FOR YOUR	
	PERSONAL INFORMATION BUT IT SHOULD NOT BE SHOWN TO OR	-
	DISCUSSED WITH ANYONE OUTSIDE OF YOUR OFFICE.	
	2. SUMMARY: THE INFORMATION ABOUT LAM SON 719 AVAIL-	
	ABLE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC THROUGHOUT THE AREA AND MUCH	÷
	OF THE REPORTAGE SHAPING THE OPINIONS OF LOCAL OFFICIALS	£
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	HAS, OF COURSE, I	SEEN LARGELY DERIVED F	ROM THE LOCAL PRESS,	
	RADIO, AND WHERE	E IT EXISTS, TELEVISION.	THROUGHOUT THE	
	REGION, IN TURN,	LOCAL PRESS REPORTING	HAS DRAWN PRINCIPALLY	
	ON FOUR WIRE SER	VICES: REUTERS, AGENCE	FRANCE PRESSE,	
-	ASSOCIATED PRESS	AND UNITED PRESS INTER	NATIONAL. ALL OF	
	THESE, ESPECIALI	LY THE FIRST TWO, HAVE E	BEEN ALMOST UNIFORMLY	
	NEGATIVE IN THEIR		AND HAVE KKKN	2
		Y TO SENSATIONAL ACCOUN		
		ATS. HENCE, LAM SON 719		
		·	TS AS AN ARVN DEFEAT	
		, AN OPERATION THAT FE		
	INT ENDED OBJECT:	•	· .	
		WS OF INFORMED GOVERNM	ENT OFFICIALS IN THE	
		ERED TEND TO BE MORE B		
		COORDINATING OFFICERS	AT LOUINCED DI PRESS	
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AND MEDIA COVERAGE. ALSO IN MANY PLACES (NOTABLY JAPAN),
THE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN MEDIA COVERAGE, ON THE ONE HAND,
AND OFFICIAL US GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS OR PRIVATE BRIEFINGS,
ON THE OTHER, HAVE ENGENDERED SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE LATTER.

- 4. LAOS: SOUVANNA PHOUMA AND SENIOR RLG OFFICIALS
 PRIVATELY VOICED FULL UNDERSTANDING OF LAM SON. PUBLICLY,
 RLG BLAMED DRV ABUSE OF LAO TERRITORY AS REASON FOR OPERATION.
 NO PUBLIC OR PRIVATE ASSESSMENTS OF OPERATION'S TERMINATION
 HAVE YET BEEN REPORTED.
- 5. CAMBODIA: THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY EXTENSIVE REPORTING ON CAMBODIAN REACTIONS BUT WHERE COMMENTS ARE AVAILABLE, GOVERNMENT LEADERS EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR OPERATION.
- 6. THAILAND: WHILE THAIS WERE STRONG VOCAL SUPPORTERS OF OPERATION, IN PRIVATE REMARKS SINCE OPERATION'S CONCLUSION,

		COORDINATING OFFICERS	
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RTG LEADERS CONSIDERED ARVN PERFORMANCE LESS THAN IMPRESSIVE. THAI PRESS, DEPENDENT AS IT WAS ON WIRE SERVICES, PICTURED OPERATION IN GLOOMY TERMS. THERE WAS SOME STRONG EDITORIAL CRITICISM OF ARVN PERFORMANCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, BANGKOK WORLD ON 26 MARCH PRESENTED REASONED ASSESSMENT OF LAM SON.

- 7. AUSTRALIA: GOVERNMENT LEADERS EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN IMPROVED ARVN ABILITIES AND IN LAM SON AND VIEWED OPERATION AS PUTTING ENEMY ON DEFENSIVE. OPINION OF HIGH-RANKING MILITARY OFFICERS ALSO FAVORABLE. OVERALL PRESS REACTION WAS GENERALLY UNFAVORABLE, HOWEVER,
- 8. NEW ZEALAND: GENERAL ATTITUDE OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL LEADERS WAS ONE OF OPTIMISM AND STRONG ENDORSEMENT OF LAM SON WHEN IT WAS LAUNCHED. ON TERMINATION OF OPERATION, HOWEVER, INITIAL OPTIMISM BECAME MUTED.

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- ON VIETNAMIZATION. PRESS REACTION WAS ABOUT EVENLY MIXED.
- 9. SOUTH KOREA: OVERALL EDITORIAL TONE IN KOREAN PRESS WAS SKEPTICAL AND MANY WRITERS ADOPTED WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE TOWARD OPERATION. EDITORIALS AT TIME OF ARVN PULLBACK GENERALLY FAVORED OPERATION, BUT WERE CRITICAL OF WHAT WAS TERMED "HASTY AND COSTLY" WITHDRAWAL. THOSE FEW POLITICIANS WHO HAVE COMMENTED PRIVATELY APPEARED SOMEWHAT PUZZLED AND UNCERTAIN OF FACTS SURROUNDING LAM SON.
- 10. JAPAN: PRESS REPORTING AND EDITORIAL COMMENTS WERE HIGHLY CRITICAL AND PICTURED OPERATION AS TOTAL FAILURE AND ARVN ROUT. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS REMAINED DUBIOUS OF OPERATION'S VALUE AND SUCCESSES.

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	11. TAIWAN:	NATIONALIST MEDIA LAUD	ED OPERATION AS	
	WHOLLY JUSTIFIED	AND USED OCCASION TO REI	TERATE CALLS FOR	
	"KNOCK-OUT BLOW	' AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM.	GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL	S
	GENERALLY ECHOE	D MEDIA LINE BUT IN LESS (COLORFUL TERMS.	

- 12. INDONESIA: INDONESIAN LEADERS DISPLAYED SOPHISTICATED ANA BALANCED VIEW OF OPERATION AND GENERALLY HELD VIEW THAT SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF LAM SON MUST BE MEASURED BY FUTURE EVENTS. AS WAS CASE ELSEWHERE, BULK OF PRESS SAW OPERATION AS SETBACK FOR VIETNAMIZATION. SOME PAPERS PROVIDED MORE BALANCED "WAIT-AND-SEE" JUDGMENT ON OPERATION.
- 13. PHILIPPINES: LESS ATTENTION WAS GIVEN TO LAM SON 719
 THAN WAS SHOWN TO LAST YEAR'S CAMBODIAN OPERATIONS. THERE
 WERE NO NOTICEABLE PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY OFFICIALS OR
 POLITICIANS. IN ADDITION TO ANTI-US ELEMENTS IN MANILA PRESS,
 GENERAL PRESS UNFAVORABLY REPORTED ARVN WITHDRAWAL.

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	ARMY OFFICERS PRIV	ATELY EXPRESSED UNDERS	STANDING OPERATION'S
	LIMITED SCOPE AND C	BJECTIVES.	
	14. MALAYSIA:	THERE WAS GENERAL NE	GATIVE PRESS
	COVERAGE OF ARVN V	VITHDRAWAL. GOVERNME	NT OFFICIALS WERE
	MORE APPRECIATIVE	OF OPERATION'S GOALS, E	SUT, NEVERTHELESS,
	REMAINED SKEPTICAL	AS TO ITS SUCCESS.	
	15. SINGAPOR	E: PRIME MINISTER LEE KU	JAN YEW WAS
	PRIVATELY CRITICAL	OF US "EUPHORIA" AT OU	ISET OF OPERATION
		RVN WOULD NOT LIVE UP T	
		NS SET FOR OPERATION. II	
		OWEVER, HE SAID THAT DEC	
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